keystone.token.providers.common

Source code for keystone.token.providers.common

# Copyright 2013 OpenStack Foundation
#
# Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may
# not use this file except in compliance with the License. You may obtain
# a copy of the License at
#
#      http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
#
# Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
# distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT
# WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. See the
# License for the specific language governing permissions and limitations
# under the License.

from __future__ import absolute_import

import base64
import datetime
import uuid

from oslo_log import log
from oslo_serialization import jsonutils
from oslo_utils import timeutils
import six
from six.moves.urllib import parse

from keystone.common import dependency
from keystone.common import utils
import keystone.conf
from keystone import exception
from keystone.federation import constants as federation_constants
from keystone.i18n import _
from keystone.models import token_model
from keystone.token.providers import base


LOG = log.getLogger(__name__)
CONF = keystone.conf.CONF


[docs]def default_expire_time(): """Determine when a fresh token should expire. Expiration time varies based on configuration (see ``[token] expiration``). :returns: a naive UTC datetime.datetime object """ expire_delta = datetime.timedelta(seconds=CONF.token.expiration) expires_at = timeutils.utcnow() + expire_delta return expires_at.replace(microsecond=0)
[docs]def random_urlsafe_str(): """Generate a random URL-safe string. :rtype: six.text_type """ # chop the padding (==) off the end of the encoding to save space return base64.urlsafe_b64encode(uuid.uuid4().bytes)[:-2].decode('utf-8')
[docs]def build_audit_info(parent_audit_id=None): """Build the audit data for a token. If ``parent_audit_id`` is None, the list will be one element in length containing a newly generated audit_id. If ``parent_audit_id`` is supplied, the list will be two elements in length containing a newly generated audit_id and the ``parent_audit_id``. The ``parent_audit_id`` will always be element index 1 in the resulting list. :param parent_audit_id: the audit of the original token in the chain :type parent_audit_id: str :returns: Keystone token audit data """ audit_id = random_urlsafe_str() if parent_audit_id is not None: return [audit_id, parent_audit_id] return [audit_id]
[docs]@dependency.requires('assignment_api', 'catalog_api', 'federation_api', 'identity_api', 'resource_api', 'role_api', 'trust_api', 'oauth_api') class V3TokenDataHelper(object): """Token data helper.""" def __init__(self): # Keep __init__ around to ensure dependency injection works. super(V3TokenDataHelper, self).__init__() def _get_filtered_domain(self, domain_id): domain_ref = self.resource_api.get_domain(domain_id) return {'id': domain_ref['id'], 'name': domain_ref['name']} def _get_filtered_project(self, project_id): project_ref = self.resource_api.get_project(project_id) filtered_project = { 'id': project_ref['id'], 'name': project_ref['name']} if project_ref['domain_id'] is not None: filtered_project['domain'] = ( self._get_filtered_domain(project_ref['domain_id'])) else: # Projects acting as a domain do not have a domain_id attribute filtered_project['domain'] = None return filtered_project def _populate_scope(self, token_data, domain_id, project_id): if 'domain' in token_data or 'project' in token_data: # scope already exist, no need to populate it again return if domain_id: token_data['domain'] = self._get_filtered_domain(domain_id) if project_id: token_data['project'] = self._get_filtered_project(project_id) project_ref = self.resource_api.get_project(project_id) token_data['is_domain'] = project_ref['is_domain'] def _populate_is_admin_project(self, token_data): # TODO(ayoung): Support the ability for a project acting as a domain # to be the admin project once the rest of the code for projects # acting as domains is merged. Code will likely be: # (r.admin_project_name == None and project['is_domain'] == True # and project['name'] == r.admin_project_domain_name) admin_project_name = CONF.resource.admin_project_name admin_project_domain_name = CONF.resource.admin_project_domain_name if not (admin_project_name and admin_project_domain_name): return # admin project not enabled project = token_data['project'] token_data['is_admin_project'] = ( project['name'] == admin_project_name and project['domain']['name'] == admin_project_domain_name) def _get_roles_for_user(self, user_id, domain_id, project_id): roles = [] if domain_id: roles = self.assignment_api.get_roles_for_user_and_domain( user_id, domain_id) if project_id: roles = self.assignment_api.get_roles_for_user_and_project( user_id, project_id) return [self.role_api.get_role(role_id) for role_id in roles]
[docs] def populate_roles_for_federated_user(self, token_data, group_ids, project_id=None, domain_id=None, user_id=None): """Populate roles basing on provided groups and project/domain. Used for federated users with dynamically assigned groups. This method does not return anything, yet it modifies token_data in place. :param token_data: a dictionary used for building token response :param group_ids: list of group IDs a user is a member of :param project_id: project ID to scope to :param domain_id: domain ID to scope to :param user_id: user ID :raises keystone.exception.Unauthorized: when no roles were found """ def check_roles(roles, user_id, project_id, domain_id): # User was granted roles so simply exit this function. if roles: return if project_id: msg = _('User %(user_id)s has no access ' 'to project %(project_id)s') % { 'user_id': user_id, 'project_id': project_id} elif domain_id: msg = _('User %(user_id)s has no access ' 'to domain %(domain_id)s') % { 'user_id': user_id, 'domain_id': domain_id} # Since no roles were found a user is not authorized to # perform any operations. Raise an exception with # appropriate error message. raise exception.Unauthorized(msg) roles = self.assignment_api.get_roles_for_groups(group_ids, project_id, domain_id) roles = roles + self._get_roles_for_user(user_id, domain_id, project_id) # NOTE(lbragstad): Remove duplicate role references from a list of # roles. It is often suggested that this be done with: # # roles = [dict(t) for t in set([tuple(d.items()) for d in roles])] # # But that doesn't actually remove duplicates in all cases and causes # transient failures because dictionaries are unordered objects. This # means {'id': 1, 'foo': 'bar'} and {'foo': 'bar', 'id': 1} won't # actually resolve to a single entity in the above logic since they are # both considered unique. By using `in` we're performing a containment # check, which also does a deep comparison of the objects, which is # what we want. unique_roles = [] for role in roles: if role not in unique_roles: unique_roles.append(role) check_roles(unique_roles, user_id, project_id, domain_id) token_data['roles'] = unique_roles
def _populate_user(self, token_data, user_id, trust): if 'user' in token_data: # no need to repopulate user if it already exists return user_ref = self.identity_api.get_user(user_id) if CONF.trust.enabled and trust and 'OS-TRUST:trust' not in token_data: trustor_user_ref = (self.identity_api.get_user( trust['trustor_user_id'])) trustee_user_ref = (self.identity_api.get_user( trust['trustee_user_id'])) try: self.resource_api.assert_domain_enabled( trustor_user_ref['domain_id']) except AssertionError: raise exception.TokenNotFound(_('Trustor domain is disabled.')) try: self.resource_api.assert_domain_enabled( trustee_user_ref['domain_id']) except AssertionError: raise exception.TokenNotFound(_('Trustee domain is disabled.')) try: self.identity_api.assert_user_enabled(trust['trustor_user_id']) except AssertionError: raise exception.Forbidden(_('Trustor is disabled.')) if trust['impersonation']: user_ref = trustor_user_ref token_data['OS-TRUST:trust'] = ( { 'id': trust['id'], 'trustor_user': {'id': trust['trustor_user_id']}, 'trustee_user': {'id': trust['trustee_user_id']}, 'impersonation': trust['impersonation'] }) filtered_user = { 'id': user_ref['id'], 'name': user_ref['name'], 'domain': self._get_filtered_domain(user_ref['domain_id']), 'password_expires_at': user_ref['password_expires_at']} token_data['user'] = filtered_user def _populate_oauth_section(self, token_data, access_token): if access_token: access_token_id = access_token['id'] consumer_id = access_token['consumer_id'] token_data['OS-OAUTH1'] = ({'access_token_id': access_token_id, 'consumer_id': consumer_id}) def _populate_roles(self, token_data, user_id, domain_id, project_id, trust, access_token): if 'roles' in token_data: # no need to repopulate roles return if access_token: filtered_roles = [] access_token_ref = self.oauth_api.get_access_token( access_token['id'] ) authed_role_ids = jsonutils.loads(access_token_ref['role_ids']) all_roles = self.role_api.list_roles() for role in all_roles: for authed_role in authed_role_ids: if authed_role == role['id']: filtered_roles.append({'id': role['id'], 'name': role['name']}) token_data['roles'] = filtered_roles return if CONF.trust.enabled and trust: # If redelegated_trust_id is set, then we must traverse the # trust_chain in order to determine who the original trustor is. We # need to do this because the user ID of the original trustor helps # us determine scope in the redelegated context. if trust.get('redelegated_trust_id'): trust_chain = self.trust_api.get_trust_pedigree(trust['id']) token_user_id = trust_chain[-1]['trustor_user_id'] else: token_user_id = trust['trustor_user_id'] token_project_id = trust['project_id'] # trusts do not support domains yet token_domain_id = None else: token_user_id = user_id token_project_id = project_id token_domain_id = domain_id if token_domain_id or token_project_id: filtered_roles = [] if CONF.trust.enabled and trust: # First expand out any roles that were in the trust to include # any implied roles, whether global or domain specific refs = [{'role_id': role['id']} for role in trust['roles']] effective_trust_roles = ( self.assignment_api.add_implied_roles(refs)) # Now get the current role assignments for the trustor, # including any domain specific roles. assignment_list = self.assignment_api.list_role_assignments( user_id=token_user_id, project_id=token_project_id, effective=True, strip_domain_roles=False) current_effective_trustor_roles = ( list(set([x['role_id'] for x in assignment_list]))) # Go through each of the effective trust roles, making sure the # trustor still has them, if any have been removed, then we # will treat the trust as invalid for trust_role in effective_trust_roles: match_roles = [x for x in current_effective_trustor_roles if x == trust_role['role_id']] if match_roles: role = self.role_api.get_role(match_roles[0]) if role['domain_id'] is None: filtered_roles.append(role) else: raise exception.Forbidden( _('Trustee has no delegated roles.')) else: for role in self._get_roles_for_user(token_user_id, token_domain_id, token_project_id): filtered_roles.append({'id': role['id'], 'name': role['name']}) # user has no project or domain roles, therefore access denied if not filtered_roles: if token_project_id: msg = _('User %(user_id)s has no access ' 'to project %(project_id)s') % { 'user_id': user_id, 'project_id': token_project_id} else: msg = _('User %(user_id)s has no access ' 'to domain %(domain_id)s') % { 'user_id': user_id, 'domain_id': token_domain_id} LOG.debug(msg) raise exception.Unauthorized(msg) token_data['roles'] = filtered_roles def _populate_service_catalog(self, token_data, user_id, domain_id, project_id, trust): if 'catalog' in token_data: # no need to repopulate service catalog return if CONF.trust.enabled and trust: user_id = trust['trustor_user_id'] if project_id or domain_id: service_catalog = self.catalog_api.get_v3_catalog( user_id, project_id) token_data['catalog'] = service_catalog def _populate_service_providers(self, token_data): if 'service_providers' in token_data: return service_providers = self.federation_api.get_enabled_service_providers() if service_providers: token_data['service_providers'] = service_providers def _populate_token_dates(self, token_data, expires=None, issued_at=None): if not expires: expires = default_expire_time() if not isinstance(expires, six.string_types): expires = utils.isotime(expires, subsecond=True) token_data['expires_at'] = expires token_data['issued_at'] = (issued_at or utils.isotime(subsecond=True)) def _populate_audit_info(self, token_data, audit_info=None): if audit_info is None or isinstance(audit_info, six.string_types): token_data['audit_ids'] = build_audit_info(audit_info) elif isinstance(audit_info, list): token_data['audit_ids'] = audit_info else: msg = (_('Invalid audit info data type: %(data)s (%(type)s)') % {'data': audit_info, 'type': type(audit_info)}) LOG.error(msg) raise exception.UnexpectedError(msg)
[docs] def get_token_data(self, user_id, method_names, domain_id=None, project_id=None, expires=None, trust=None, token=None, include_catalog=True, bind=None, access_token=None, issued_at=None, audit_info=None): token_data = {'methods': method_names} # We've probably already written these to the token if token: for x in ('roles', 'user', 'catalog', 'project', 'domain'): if x in token: token_data[x] = token[x] if bind: token_data['bind'] = bind self._populate_scope(token_data, domain_id, project_id) if token_data.get('project'): self._populate_is_admin_project(token_data) self._populate_user(token_data, user_id, trust) self._populate_roles(token_data, user_id, domain_id, project_id, trust, access_token) self._populate_audit_info(token_data, audit_info) if include_catalog: self._populate_service_catalog(token_data, user_id, domain_id, project_id, trust) self._populate_service_providers(token_data) self._populate_token_dates(token_data, expires=expires, issued_at=issued_at) self._populate_oauth_section(token_data, access_token) return {'token': token_data}
[docs]@dependency.requires('catalog_api', 'identity_api', 'oauth_api', 'resource_api', 'role_api', 'trust_api') class BaseProvider(base.Provider): def __init__(self, *args, **kwargs): super(BaseProvider, self).__init__(*args, **kwargs) self.v3_token_data_helper = V3TokenDataHelper()
[docs] def get_token_version(self, token_data): if token_data and isinstance(token_data, dict): if 'token_version' in token_data: if token_data['token_version'] in token_model.VERSIONS: return token_data['token_version'] # FIXME(morganfainberg): deprecate the following logic in future # revisions. It is better to just specify the token_version in # the token_data itself. This way we can support future versions # that might have the same fields. if 'access' in token_data: return token_model.V2 if 'token' in token_data and 'methods' in token_data['token']: return token_model.V3 raise exception.UnsupportedTokenVersionException()
def _is_mapped_token(self, auth_context): return (federation_constants.IDENTITY_PROVIDER in auth_context and federation_constants.PROTOCOL in auth_context)
[docs] def issue_token(self, user_id, method_names, expires_at=None, project_id=None, domain_id=None, auth_context=None, trust=None, include_catalog=True, parent_audit_id=None): if auth_context and auth_context.get('bind'): # NOTE(lbragstad): Check if the token provider being used actually # supports bind authentication methods before proceeding. if not self._supports_bind_authentication: raise exception.NotImplemented(_( 'The configured token provider does not support bind ' 'authentication.')) if CONF.trust.enabled and trust: if user_id != trust['trustee_user_id']: raise exception.Forbidden(_('User is not a trustee.')) token_ref = None if auth_context and self._is_mapped_token(auth_context): token_ref = self._handle_mapped_tokens( auth_context, project_id, domain_id) access_token = None if 'oauth1' in method_names: access_token_id = auth_context['access_token_id'] access_token = self.oauth_api.get_access_token(access_token_id) token_data = self.v3_token_data_helper.get_token_data( user_id, method_names, domain_id=domain_id, project_id=project_id, expires=expires_at, trust=trust, bind=auth_context.get('bind') if auth_context else None, token=token_ref, include_catalog=include_catalog, access_token=access_token, audit_info=parent_audit_id) token_id = self._get_token_id(token_data) return token_id, token_data
def _handle_mapped_tokens(self, auth_context, project_id, domain_id): user_id = auth_context['user_id'] group_ids = auth_context['group_ids'] idp = auth_context[federation_constants.IDENTITY_PROVIDER] protocol = auth_context[federation_constants.PROTOCOL] user_dict = self.identity_api.get_user(user_id) user_name = user_dict['name'] token_data = { 'user': { 'id': user_id, 'name': parse.unquote(user_name), federation_constants.FEDERATION: { 'groups': [{'id': x} for x in group_ids], 'identity_provider': {'id': idp}, 'protocol': {'id': protocol} }, 'domain': { 'id': CONF.federation.federated_domain_name, 'name': CONF.federation.federated_domain_name } } } if project_id or domain_id: self.v3_token_data_helper.populate_roles_for_federated_user( token_data, group_ids, project_id, domain_id, user_id) return token_data def _verify_token_ref(self, token_ref): """Verify and return the given token_ref.""" if not token_ref: raise exception.Unauthorized(_('Token is absent')) return token_ref
[docs] def validate_token(self, token_id): user_id = None # id of the user of the token methods = None # list of methods used to obtain a token bind = None # dictionary of bind methods issued_at = None # time at which the token was issued expires_at = None # time at which the token will expire audit_ids = None # list of audit ids specific to the token domain_id = None # domain scope of the token project_id = None # project scope of the token access_token = None # dictionary containing OAUTH1 information trust_ref = None # dictionary containing trust scope token_dict = None # existing token information if self.needs_persistence(): token_ref = token_id token_data = token_ref.get('token_data') user_id = token_ref['user_id'] if not token_data or 'token' not in token_data: # NOTE(lbragstad): We should never get here. With the # issue_token refactors that landed in Ocata, we should no # longer be persisting different types of tokens. Everything is # a v3 token, period. If a token needs to be represented in the # v2.0 format, it should be translated at the controller layer. # This code can be removed when Pike opens for development. # The only reason I'm not removing it now is because of the # ability for a v2.0 token to be persisted while Newton code is # still active in an upgrade to Ocata. Hopefully once a # deployer is ready to upgrade to Ocata, there won't be any # valid v2.0 formatted tokens in the backend and we can safely # remove this case, which will be in Pike. methods = ['password', 'token'] bind = token_ref.get('bind') # I have no idea why issued_at and expires_at come from two # different places... issued_at = ( token_ref['token_data']['access']['token']['issued_at'] ) expires_at = token_ref['expires'] audit_ids = token_ref['token_data']['access']['token'].get( 'audit_ids' ) project_id = None project_ref = token_ref.get('tenant') if project_ref: project_id = project_ref['id'] trust_id = token_ref.get('trust_id') if trust_id: trust_ref = self.trust_api.get_trust(trust_id) else: # NOTE(lbragstad): Otherwise assume we are validating a token # that was created using the v3 token API. methods = token_data['token']['methods'] bind = token_data['token'].get('bind') issued_at = token_data['token']['issued_at'] expires_at = token_data['token']['expires_at'] audit_ids = token_data['token'].get('audit_ids') domain_id = token_data['token'].get('domain', {}).get('id') project_id = token_data['token'].get('project', {}).get('id') access_token = None if token_data['token'].get('OS-OAUTH1'): access_token = { 'id': token_data['token'].get('OS-OAUTH1', {}).get( 'access_token_id' ), 'consumer_id': token_data['token'].get( 'OS-OAUTH1', {} ).get('consumer_id') } trust_ref = None trust_id = token_ref.get('trust_id') if trust_id: trust_ref = self.trust_api.get_trust(trust_id) token_dict = None if token_data['token']['user'].get( federation_constants.FEDERATION): token_dict = {'user': token_ref['user']} else: try: (user_id, methods, audit_ids, domain_id, project_id, trust_id, federated_info, access_token_id, issued_at, expires_at) = ( self.token_formatter.validate_token(token_id)) except exception.ValidationError as e: raise exception.TokenNotFound(e) token_dict = None trust_ref = None if federated_info: # NOTE(lbragstad): We need to rebuild information about the # federated token as well as the federated token roles. This is # because when we validate a non-persistent token, we don't # have a token reference to pull the federated token # information out of. As a result, we have to extract it from # the token itself and rebuild the federated context. These # private methods currently live in the # keystone.token.providers.fernet.Provider() class. token_dict = self._rebuild_federated_info( federated_info, user_id ) if project_id or domain_id: self._rebuild_federated_token_roles( token_dict, federated_info, user_id, project_id, domain_id ) if trust_id: trust_ref = self.trust_api.get_trust(trust_id) access_token = None if access_token_id: access_token = self.oauth_api.get_access_token(access_token_id) return self.v3_token_data_helper.get_token_data( user_id, method_names=methods, domain_id=domain_id, project_id=project_id, issued_at=issued_at, expires=expires_at, trust=trust_ref, token=token_dict, bind=bind, access_token=access_token, audit_info=audit_ids)
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