開発中バージョンのリリースノート

32.0.0.0rc1-6

セキュリティー上の問題

• Fixed multiple Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerabilities in Glance's image import functionality. These vulnerabilities could allow attackers to bypass URL validation and access internal resources.

  web-download Import Method SSRF:

  The web-download import method had two SSRF vulnerabilities:

  HTTP Redirect Bypass: The web-download import method did not validate redirect destinations when following HTTP redirects. An attacker could provide an initial URL that passed validation, but redirect to an internal or disallowed resource that would bypass the security checks. This has been fixed by implementing SafeRedirectHandler that validates redirect destinations before following them using the same validate_import_uri() checks as the initial URL.

  IP Address Encoding Bypass: The web-download import method's URL validation could be bypassed by encoding IP addresses in alternative formats (decimal integer, hexadecimal, octal). For example, 127.0.0.1 could be encoded as 2130706433 (decimal) or 0x7f000001 (hexadecimal) to bypass blacklist checks. This has been fixed by implementing normalize_hostname() function that uses Python's ipaddress module to validate IP addresses. The ipaddress module only accepts standard dotted-decimal notation for IPv4 and standard format for IPv6, automatically rejecting all encoded formats (decimal, hexadecimal, octal). Any attempt to use encoded IP formats is rejected, preventing SSRF bypass attacks.

  glance-download Import Method SSRF:

  The glance-download import method had redirect validation bypass vulnerabilities in two steps of the import flow:

  Image Data Download: When downloading image data from a remote Glance endpoint, redirects were not validated, allowing attackers to redirect to internal services.

  Metadata Fetch: When fetching image metadata from a remote Glance endpoint, redirects were not validated, allowing attackers to redirect to internal services.

  Both steps have been fixed by using SafeRedirectHandler to validate redirect destinations before following them.

  OVF Processing SSRF:

  The OVF processing functionality had a critical SSRF vulnerability with zero protection - no URI validation, no redirect validation, and no IP normalization. The code directly called urllib.request.urlopen(uri) without any validation checks. This has been fixed by adding URI validation using validate_import_uri() and redirect validation using SafeRedirectHandler.

  Affected Components:

  • glance.common.scripts.utils.get_image_data_iter()

  • glance.common.utils.validate_import_uri()

  • glance.async_.flows._internal_plugins.glance_download._DownloadGlanceImage.execute()

  • glance.async_.flows.api_image_import._ImportMetadata.execute()

  • glance.async_.flows.ovf_process._OVF_Process._get_ova_iter_objects()

  Impact:

  • Severity: High (web-download, glance-download), Critical (OVF processing)

  • Affected Versions: All versions prior to this fix

  • Workaround: Administrators can temporarily disable affected import methods by removing them from the enabled_import_methods configuration option

  Bugs #2138602, #2138672, #2138675

バグ修正

• Bug 2138602: Fixed SSRF vulnerability in web-download import method via HTTP redirect bypass and IP address encoding bypass. Added redirect validation using SafeRedirectHandler and IP address validation using Python's ipaddress module to reject encoded IP formats and prevent bypass attacks.

  Bug 2138672: Fixed SSRF vulnerability in glance-download import method via HTTP redirect bypass. Added redirect validation for both image data download and metadata fetch operations.

  Bug 2138675: Fixed SSRF vulnerability in OVF processing functionality which lacked URI validation. Added URI validation and redirect validation to prevent SSRF attacks when processing OVA files.