Architecture page guidance

The purpose of an architecture page is to document the architecture, purpose and security controls of a service or project. It should document the best practice deployment of that project.

There are some key sections to the architecture page, which are explained in more detail below:

  • Title, version information, contact details

  • Project description and purpose

  • Primary users and use-cases

  • External dependencies and associated security assumptions

  • Components

  • Architecture diagram

  • Data assets

  • Data asset impact analysis

  • Interfaces

Title, version information, contact details

This section titles the architecture page, gives the status of the review (draft, ready for review, reviewed) and captures the release and version of the project (where relevant). It also records the PTL for the project, the project’s architect who is responsible for producing the architecture page, diagrams and working through the review (this may or may not be the PTL), and the security reviewer(s).

Project description and purpose

This section will contain a brief description of the project to introduce third parties to the service. This should be a paragraph or two and can be cut/paste from wiki or other documentation. Include links to relevant presentations and further documentation if available.

For example:

“Anchor is a public key infrastructure (PKI) service, which uses automated certificate request validation to automate issuing decisions. Certificates are issued for short time periods (typically 12-48 hours) to avoid the flawed revocation issues associated with CRLs and OCSP.”

Primary users and use-cases

A list of the expected primary users of the implemented architecture and their use-cases. ‘Users’ can either be actors or other services within OpenStack.

For example:

  1. End users will use the system to store sensitive data, such as passphrases encryption keys, etc.

  2. Cloud administrators will use the administrative APIs to manage resource quotas.

External dependencies and associated security assumptions

External dependencies are items outside of the control of the service that are required for its operation, and may impact the service if they were compromised or became unavailable. These items are usually outside the control of the developer but within the control of the deployer, or they may be operated by a third party. Appliances should be regarded as external dependencies.

For example:

  • Nova compute service depends on an external authentication and authorization service. In a typical deployment this dependency will be fulfilled by the keystone service.

  • Barbican depends on the use of Hardware Security Module (HSM) appliance.


A list of the components of the deployed project excluding external entities. Each component should be named and have a brief description of its purpose, and be labeled with the primary technology used (e.g. Python, MySQL, RabbitMQ).

For example:

  • keystone listener process (Python): Python process that consumes keystone events published by the keystone service.

  • Database (MySQL): MySQL database to store barbican state data related to its managed entities and their metadata.

Service architecture diagram

The architecture diagram shows the logical layout of the system so the security reviewers can step through the architecture with the project team. It is a logical diagram which shows how the components interact, how they connect to external entities, and where communications cross trust boundaries. Further information on architecture diagram, including a key of symbols, will be given in the upcoming architecture diagram guidance. Diagrams can be drawn in any tool that can produce a diagram which uses the symbols in the key, however is strongly recommended.

This example shows the barbican architecture diagram:


Data assets

Data assets are user data, high-value data, configuration items, authorization tokens or other items that an attacker may target. The set of data items will vary between projects, but in general it should be considered as classes of data which are vital to the intended operation of the project. The level of detail required is somewhat dependent on the context. Data can usually be grouped, such as ‘user data’, ‘secret data’, or ‘configuration files’, but may be singular, like ‘admin identity token’ or ‘user identity token’, or ‘database configuration file’.

Data assets should include a statement of where that asset is persisted.

For example:

  • Secret data - Passphrases, Encryption Keys, RSA Keys - persisted in Database [PKCS#11] or HSM [KMIP] or [KMIP, Dogtag]

  • RBAC rulesets - persisted in policy.json

  • RabbitMQ Credentials - persisted in barbican.conf

  • keystone Event Queue Credentials - persisted in barbican.conf

  • Middleware configuration - persisted in paste.ini

Data asset impact analysis

The data asset impact analysis breaks down the impact of the loss of confidentiality, integrity or availability for each data asset. Project architects should attempt to complete this, as they understand their project in the most detail, but the OpenStack Security Project (OSSP) will work through this with the project during the security review and are likely to add or update the impact details.

For example:

  • RabbitMQ credentials:

    • Integrity Failure Impact: barbican and Workers can no longer access the queue. Denial of service.

    • Confidentiality Failure Impact: An attacker could add new tasks to the queue which would be executed by workers. User quotas could be exhausted by an attacker. DoS. User would be unable to create genuine secrets.

    • Availability Failure Impact: barbican could no longer create new secrets without access to the queue.

  • keystone credentials:

    • Integrity Failure Impact: barbican will not be able to validate user credentials and fail. DoS.

    • Confidentially Failure Impact: A malicious user might be able to abuse other OpenStack services (depending on keystone role configurations) but barbican is unaffected. If the service account for token validation also has barbican admin privileges, then a malicious user could manipulate barbican admin functions.

    • Availability Failure Impact: barbican will not be able to validate user credentials and fail. DoS.


The interfaces listing captures interfaces within the scope of the review. This includes connections between blocks on the architecture diagram which cross a trust boundary or do not use an industry standard encryption protocol such as TLS or SSH. For each interface the following information is captured:

  • The protocol used

  • Any data assets in transit across that interface

  • Information on authentication used to connect to that interface

  • A brief description of the purpose of the interface.

This is recorded in the following format:

From->To [Transport]:

  • Assets in flight

  • Authentication?

  • Description

For example:

  1. Client->API Process [TLS]:

    • Assets in flight: User keystone credentials, plaintext secrets, HTTP verb, secret ID, path

    • Access to keystone credentials or plaintext secrets is considered a total security failure of the system - this interface must have robust confidentiality and integrity controls.


List resources relevant to the project, such as wiki pages describing its deployment and usage, and links to code repositories and relevant presentations.