OSSN-0088: Some of the Glance metadef APIs likely to leak resources¶
Summary¶
Metadef APIs are vulnerable and potentially leaking information to unauthorized users and also there is currently no limit on creation of metadef namespaces, objects, properties, resources and tags. This can be abused by malicious users to fill the Glance database resulting in a Denial of Service (DoS) condition.
Affected Services / Software¶
Glance, Horizon
Discussion¶
There is no restriction on creation of metadef namespaces, objects, properties, resources and tags as well as it could also leak the information to unauthorized users or to the users outside of the project. By taking advantage of this lack of restrictions around metadef APIs, a single user could fill the Glance database by creating unlimited resources, resulting in a Denial Of Service (DoS) style attack.
Glance does allow metadef APIs to be controlled by policy. However, the default policy setting for metadef APIs allows all users to create or read the metadef information.
Because metadef resources are not properly isolated to the owner, any use of them with potentially sensitive names (such as internal infrastructure details, customer names, etc) could unintentionally expose that information to a malicious user.
Recommended Actions¶
Since these fundamental issues have been present since the API was introduced, the Glance project is recommending operators to keep create/modify/delete APIs to admin only and provide read access to all users in their deployments.
Here is an example of allowing create/modify/delete metadef APIs to be
admin only and read access to normal users in the deployments for
current stable OpenStack releases either in policy.json or
policy.yaml:
"metadef_default": "",
"metadef_admin": "role:admin",
"get_metadef_namespace": "rule:metadef_default",
"get_metadef_namespaces": "rule:metadef_default",
"modify_metadef_namespace": "rule:metadef_admin",
"add_metadef_namespace": "rule:metadef_admin",
"delete_metadef_namespace": "rule:metadef_admin",
"get_metadef_object": "rule:metadef_default",
"get_metadef_objects": "rule:metadef_default",
"modify_metadef_object": "rule:metadef_admin",
"add_metadef_object": "rule:metadef_admin",
"delete_metadef_object": "rule:metadef_admin",
"list_metadef_resource_types": "rule:metadef_default",
"get_metadef_resource_type": "rule:metadef_default",
"add_metadef_resource_type_association": "rule:metadef_admin",
"remove_metadef_resource_type_association": "rule:metadef_admin",
"get_metadef_property": "rule:metadef_default",
"get_metadef_properties": "rule:metadef_default",
"modify_metadef_property": "rule:metadef_admin",
"add_metadef_property": "rule:metadef_admin",
"remove_metadef_property": "rule:metadef_admin",
"get_metadef_tag": "rule:metadef_default",
"get_metadef_tags": "rule:metadef_default",
"modify_metadef_tag": "rule:metadef_admin",
"add_metadef_tag": "rule:metadef_admin",
"add_metadef_tags": "rule:metadef_admin",
"delete_metadef_tag": "rule:metadef_admin",
"delete_metadef_tags": "rule:metadef_admin",
Operators with users that depend on metadef APIs may choose to leave these accessible to all users. In that case, education of users about the potential for information leakage in the resource names is advisable so that vulnerable practices can be altered as mitigation.
To re-enable metadef policies to all users, operator(s) can make a
change in respective policy.json or policy.yaml as shown below
(assuming metadef create/modify/delete policies are configured to use
rule:metadef_admin as shown in the above example):
"metadef_admin": "",
Contacts / References¶
Author: Abhishek Kekane (Red Hat), Lance Bragstad (Red Hat)
This OSSN : https://docs.openstack.org/security-notes/OSSN-0088.html
Original LaunchPad Bug : https://bugs.launchpad.net/glance/+bug/1545702
Original LaunchPad Bug : https://bugs.launchpad.net/glance/+bug/1916926
Original LaunchPad Bug : https://bugs.launchpad.net/glance/+bug/1916922
Mailing List : openstack-security@lists.openstack.org
OpenStack Security Project : https://launchpad.net/~openstack-ossg
